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to revealed knowledge undermines the entire natural theology project as
historically understood.
How should one characterize this post-Humean natural theology
project? The distinction between natural theology and revealed religion
has been significantly blurred. One can understand this as an argument
against Hume, as a capitulation to Hume, or as the grateful refinement of
the natural theology project in light of Hume’s forceful and telling criticisms of earlier, inadequate employments of natural theology. While this
volume does not give a clear answer to this question, the work done within
its pages aids greatly one’s attempts to grasp the place of natural theology
in the broader religious context. In that regard, this volume is a valuable
addition to contemporary Christian scholarship.

Faith, Reason and the Existence of God, by Denys Turner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xix + 271. $70.00 (cloth), $29.99 (paper).
DAVID BRADSHAW, University of Kentucky
Denys Turner is a theologian and the author of The Darkness of God (1995),
a well-received study of mystical theology. In the Preface to the present
volume he remarks that his earlier book led some to object that he had
taken apophaticism “to the point of apparently denying that we can say
anything true of God,” as was not his intent (p. xiii). His goal in Faith, Reason and the Existence of God is to redress that imbalance through a careful
exploration of what reason can and cannot accomplish in relation to God.
Specifically, Turner (a Roman Catholic) defends the position of the First
Vatican Council that it is an article of faith that the existence of God can be
known by natural reason. This might seem to place him at odds with the
apophatic approach that he earlier defended. Turner, however, believes
that natural theology and apophaticism are natural allies, for natural theology properly pursued places reason “at the end of its tether,” asking
“the sorts of questions the answers to which . . . are beyond the power of
reason to comprehend” (p. xv). If there are rationally compelling proofs of
the existence of God, as he believes there must be, “what the ‘proofs’ prove
is at one and the same time the existence of God and that, as said of God,
we have finally lost our hold on the meaning of ‘exists’” (p. 87).
It will be noticed that I say if there are such proofs. Although Turner
is confident that such proofs must be available, he does not himself oﬀer
one, nor does he say where in the tradition they are to be found. He holds
up Aquinas’s Five Ways as a model of how such proofs ought to be done,
but he makes no attempt to rebut the standard objections to the Five Ways
or to update Aquinas in contemporary terms. Surprisingly, near the end
of the book it emerges that Turner’s preferred argument strategy would
begin with the question, “why is there something rather than nothing?”
This is of course the question famously posed by Leibniz. Turner seems to
think that it would be preferable to develop the argument in a Thomistic
rather than Leibnizian fashion, but he does not elaborate in any detail. His
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eﬀort is limited to arguing, against Kantian or Russellian objections, that
the question itself is a legitimate one.
Turner is aware that his failure to provide an actual argument for the
existence of God may seem odd. As a theologian, however, he sees his
own role as that of explicating the content of faith. Certainly the task of
arguing that it is an article of faith that God can be proven to exist is significant its own right. Turner sees the major resistance to this view as coming
from the fear that to prove God’s existence is necessarily to diminish the
mystery of God by placing God within a network of causal explanatory
relationships. This suspicion, in turn, he traces back to the Scotistic rejection of analogy. If, as Scotus believed, any argument for the existence of
God must use terms univocally in the premises (said of creatures) and the
conclusion (said of God), then such an argument will indeed make God
describable in the same way as creatures. That would be incompatible, not
only with traditional apophatic theology, but with any proper regard for
the divine mystery.
Turner’s reply to Scotus is a simple one. Although it is true that in a
valid argument a term occurring more than once in the premises must bear
the same sense (barring some explicit disambiguation) in those occurrences,
there is no requirement that it do so in the conclusion as well. He illustrates the point with the terms ‘cause’ and ‘mutable thing’: each has a univocal meaning within the empirical domain, but when they are combined
into the phrase “cause of every mutable thing,” the term ‘cause’ takes on a
diﬀerent meaning which can be understood only by extrapolation (p. 212).
As Turner recognizes, this point was made years ago by Peter Geach in his
“Causality and Creation” (reprinted in God and the Soul). It is surely correct
as far as it goes. However, to go on to claim that in such an extrapolation
we “lose our hold” on the meaning of the terms involved, and indeed that
“we could not know the meaning of what we are justified in attributing”
to God (p. 206), is quite unwarranted. Geach’s point is precisely that we do
retain some sense of the meaning of the terms involved; otherwise there
would be no purpose to doing the extrapolation. In the case of ‘cause,’
for example, we retain the basic understanding that if it were not for the
action of God, creatures would not exist. That may not be all that is involved in our ordinary understanding of cause, but it is certainly more
than nothing.
Turner’s exaggeration at this point is symptomatic of a larger misunderstanding. He seems to think of apophaticism primarily in terms
of what we do or do not understand, so that a view of God is properly
apophatic only if it leaves us with no clear understanding of what we
mean in speaking of God. But traditionally apophatic theologians made
at least one clear and definitive statement about God: God is not an intelligible object. By this they meant not exactly that He cannot be understood by us, but that He is not an object of noēsis, “intellection.” Noēsis
is the kind of thinking that “divides reality at the joints” (to use Plato’s
metaphor) by becoming isomorphic to the actual character of the object
thought. It figures centrally in Aristotle’s theory of the Prime Mover and
Plotinus’ theory of Intellect, both of which (the Prime Mover and Intellect)
are the single, fully actual act of noēsis which embraces all possible intelligible content. To say that God is not an intelligible object (noēton) means
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that He is not the sort of being that can be embraced in the act of noēsis,
for He has no intelligible structure—no form, essence, or definition—of
the sort to which our thought can conform. It does not mean that we cannot speak meaningfully of Him. The more apophatically inclined among
the Church Fathers, such as Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory Nazianzen,
state clearly that we can and should form conceptions (ennoiai) and mental images (phantasmata) of God. What we cannot do is form a noēma, the
particular kind of concept that “latches on” to the object by mirroring its
ontological structure.
It is remarkable that Turner, who surely must know the classical
sources, says nothing about these matters. I suspect the reason is that he
is determined to present Aquinas as an apophatic theologian. Although
this is currently a fashionable view, it cannot be sustained without considerable distortion of either Aquinas or apophaticism. Far from holding
that God is not an intelligible object, Aquinas, like Augustine before him,
holds that God is the supreme intelligible object, the one whom all rational
beings achieve their telos in apprehending. All that Aquinas says about
the unknowability of God pertains solely to this life, when our thinking
is constrained to operate with mental images derived through the senses.
(See, for example, the passage quoted by Turner on p. 43.) In the afterlife
the blessed, like the angels, will enjoy a direct vision of the divine essence.
There could scarcely be a sharper contrast on this point between Aquinas
and the Greek Fathers, who consistently teach that the divine essence remains unknown even to the angels and the blessed.
Apophaticism thus understood might appear to be a rather stark and
minimalist view. However, although the Greek Fathers deny the possibility of a conceptual knowledge of God, they do hold that there can be a
direct experience of God, not only in the afterlife but in the present life as
well. By contrast, Aquinas (as Turner rightly notes) holds that “there is no
experience of God of any kind in this life” (p. 120). Given the Thomistic
view, it is no doubt correct that if natural reason is to know with certainty
the existence of God, it must do so via rational demonstration. That is
presumably why Turner leaps immediately from the proposition that God
can be known to exist through the evidence of creation to the claim that
this knowledge “could, at least theoretically, be expanded out into a formal
proof” (p. 13)—a claim, incidentally, not made by Vatican I. He seems to
overlook that there are many things one can know that one cannot prove,
such as the immediate deliverances of perception and memory. This leap
makes sense only on the assumption that natural reason is limited in its
means of knowing God to rational demonstration.
For an alternative view, one has only to consider the biblical passages that
have traditionally been cited on behalf of the possibility of natural theology.
St. Paul says that “that which may be known of God is manifest in them [the
unrighteous]; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible things of
him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead” (Rom. 1:19–20,
my italics). There is no reference here to a rational demonstration; Paul simply assumes that nature can be seen to be God’s handiwork. The same is
true in the other passages traditionally cited in this vein, such as Acts 14:17,
Wisdom of Solomon 13:1–5, and Psalms 19 and 104.
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One reason Turner is eager to insist on the possibility of rational demonstration is that he wants the debate between theists and atheists to be
“capable of being conducted on shared rational grounds” (p. xii). But to
hold that God can be seen in nature, if one is in the proper moral and
spiritual condition, is not at all to deny a role for rational argument. Just
as one often has to argue with a friend in order to get him to see something
that really ought to be obvious, rational argument may be of great help in
achieving the right state of perceptive awareness regarding nature. (See
on this point Del Ratzsch, “Perceiving Design” in God and Design, ed. Neil
Manson [Routledge, 2003], pp. 124–44.) The church fathers certainly were
not shy in using argument to refute materialist or polytheistic understandings of nature. However, they typically understood their own argument,
not as a demonstration that God exists, but as a way of explicating nature
so as to make apparent to our sinful and fallen eyes something that in its
own nature is perfectly evident. Thus St. Athanasius remarks: “as they tell
of Phidias the sculptor that his works of art by their symmetry and by the
proportion of their parts betray Phidias to those who see them although
he is not there, so by the order of the universe one ought to perceive God
its maker and artificer, even though He be not seen with the bodily eyes”
(Contra Gentes, chap. 35). One ought to perceive. Certainly there is an important role for rational argument here, but it is ultimately no more than that
of opening the eyes to something that is plainly there.
In sum, it seems to me that Turner’s devotion to Aquinas leads him to
misconstrue both the nature of apophaticism and the proper goals and
character of natural theology. Nonetheless, the book oﬀers a useful critique of Scotistic univocity and of many pernicious and irrationalist trends
in contemporary theology. Anyone who seeks to achieve an authentically
Christian approach to philosophy will find in it much food for thought.

The Most Real Being: A Biblical and Philosophical Defense of Divine Determinism,
by J. A. Crabtree. Eugene, Oregon: Gutenberg College Press, 2004. Pp xvii
& 384. $33.00.
ROBERT AARON JOHNSON, University of Oklahoma
This book is a defense of divine determinism: the doctrine that God
causes every event to transpire exactly as it does. Chapters one through
four are intended to introduce and motivate the book’s topics to a nonphilosophical audience. Chapter five is an argument for divine determinism from scripture. The philosophically interesting material starts with
chapter six. In chapters six and seven, Crabtree argues that divine determinism is implied by creation ex nihilo and that it is implied by divine
foreknowledge. In chapter eight, he gives a separate philosophical argument for divine determinism. In chapters nine, ten and eleven, he defends
divine determinism against the charge that it is inconsistent with human
free will, that it is inconsistent with divine goodness given the existence
and extent of evil, and that it undercuts our motivation to be good.

